The central argument which is advanced by this article is that, whilst there is no outright obligation in Brussels I which prevents parallel proceedings between a court action and arbitration between the same parties and concerning a similar cause of action, the revisions in the recast Brussels I, along with the Gazprom interpretation of key non-revised parts of Brussels I, do certainly provide improved support for international commercial arbitration.
in the ways stated above: through anti-suit injunctions issued by an arbitral tribunal; through finding parties taking parallel court action to be in breach of the arbitration agreement; and by giving primacy to the arbitral award where it is irreconcilable with a parallel court judgment.
The article is structured as follows. Section B explains the importance of international commercial arbitration as a method of dispute resolution in the business community noting that it has become 'the normal method of resolving disputes in international transactions. 
B. Introducing the threat posed by parallel proceedings to international arbitration
International arbitration is very important for the resolution of international commercial disputes, because of the scope it provides for commercial parties to make autonomous choices as to how they will resolve those disputes. In a survey conducted in 2009, 63% of large EUbased companies stated that they prefer arbitration over court litigation, and where they have a In what ways do parallel proceedings threaten the success of international arbitration within the EU? Parallel proceedings occur for a number of reasons. The most common reason is where a party brings proceedings before a national court, (allegedly) in breach of an arbitration agreement. This is sometimes done in the genuine belief that the agreement to arbitrate is invalid, void, or inoperable. 15 However, unfortunately, sometimes parallel proceedings are brought in bad faith solely to delay the arbitral proceedings by taking advantage of slow national court procedures. 16 If these parallel proceedings prove to be lengthy, and arbitral proceedings have already commenced, this poses a serious threat to the efficiency of the arbitral proceedings, and also of course, hinders the aggrieved party's access to an effective remedy. This may in turn encourage parties to arbitrate their disputes in a place 14 See Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment, supra n 9, para 2.4.1.3. 15 outside the EU which provides more 'legal certainty about the arbitral proceedings', making the EU less attractive as a seat of international arbitration. 17 Brussels I is the main EU instrument harmonising the jurisdiction of the courts and recognition of judgments in civil and commercial law matters. As we shall outline below, the relationship of Brussels I to arbitration is a complex one, but for present purposes it suffices to say that Brussels I does not offer an explicit solution to the problem of parallel proceedings. 18 Equally, there is no convincing solution to the problem of parallel proceedings under international law or documents. International law responds to the threat of parallel proceedings in Article II of the New York Convention, which requires the national court to stay proceedings brought in breach of an arbitration agreement unless the court finds that the arbitration agreement is void, voidable, inoperative or incapable of being performed. 19 The qualification of the duty to stay, which is subject to the national law of the court seised of the parallel proceedings, has allowed too much scope for the national courts when deciding whether the arbitration agreement is formally or materially invalid. More often than not the assessment whether or not to stay could take a long period of time depending on the time it takes a national 17 Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment, supra n 9, para 2.4.1. 21 In the Case of Allianz SpA, supra n 6, Italian procedural law demonstrated its inefficiency in dealing with the core question of whether the arbitrational agreement between the parties was valid. Moreover, Italian law does not recognise that a subrogated party is bound by an arbitration agreement included in the contract between the beneficiary and a third party, whereas the English court held the opposite view. See West Tankers, supra n 12. 22 National law is relevant where the matter is deemed to fall outside the scope of Brussels I, insofar as it concerns proceedings involving a matter relating to arbitration. 23 Anti-suit injunctions are equitable remedies mostly used as a procedural mechanism by common law courts in order to prohibit parties from pursuing court proceedings in breach of a choice of court or arbitration agreement. See Ojiegbe, supra n 7, 267-268 for a further discussion on this point. See also T Hartley, "The Brussels I Regulation and Arbitration" (2014) 63 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 843. 24 Allianz SpA, supra n 6.
C. The treatment of parallel proceedings under the system of Brussels I
This section explains the juridical and philosophical underpinnings of Brussels I which become relevant when dealing with the interface between Brussels I and international arbitration and come to the fore in the problematic situations described above relating to parallel proceedings. This is key to properly understanding the reasoning in the Gazprom case, the revisions made by the recast Brussels I and the implications of both for improving the Member States' ability to protect international arbitration from a potentially over-permissive application of the principle of effectiveness of EU law.
The Early Years leading to West Tankers
Brussels I is concerned with determining which courts (i.e. from which EU country) have jurisdiction over any given civil or commercial dispute, and with the recognition and enforcement of judgments made in other Member States. The only reference to arbitration in the text of the original Brussels I is in Article 1(2)(d), which simply states that 'arbitration' is excluded from its scope. 25 The Jenard Report on the interpretation of the Brussels Convention explained that the exclusion of arbitration was intended to prevent an overlap between the Brussels Convention and treaty law on international commercial arbitration, particularly the New York Convention.
26
At the time leading to the accession of the UK to the Brussels Convention a committee led by Lord Kilbrandon advised that the exclusion of arbitration from the Brussels Convention 25 The same was included in the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters OJ L 299, 31/12/1972 P. 0032-0042, which was the predecessor of the Brussels I Regulation. 26 
Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968 prepared by P Jenard (OJ 1979 C 59/1), 13.
"should be understood in the widest sense." 27 The meaning of "widest sense" was later fleshed out by the UK representatives to include "all disputes which the parties had effectively agreed should be settled by arbitration, including any secondary disputes connected with the agreed arbitration." 28 However, the original Member States of the EU understood the exclusion to only include court proceedings in a Member State concerning arbitration, whether concluded, in
progress or yet to be begun.
29
The Schlosser Report stressed that the term 'arbitration' under Article 1 could not extend to every dispute that was affected by an arbitration agreement. 30 The report drew a distinction between proceedings which were directly concerned with arbitration and proceedings which only incidentally concerned arbitration. Proceedings which were directly concerned with arbitration as the principal issue (e.g. the establishment of the tribunal, annulment or the recognition of the validity or defectiveness of an award) were outside the scope of the Brussels Convention. But where arbitration arose as an incidental question, eg the verification of the validity of an arbitration agreement which was relied on by a litigant in order to contest the jurisdiction of the court before which he was being sued pursuant to the Brussels Convention, the litigation fell within the scope of the Convention. Advocate General Kokott stressed that the use of an anti-suit injunction undermines the underlying principle of trust and confidence which is important to the system of Brussels I, and is contrary to the general principle that every court seised itself determines whether it has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. At the core of the AG's opinion was that anti-suit injunctions are contrary to the principle of effective judicial protection which is so essential to the EU internal market and the system of Brussels I. 42 Whilst acknowledging that in exceptional circumstances preserving the principle of effectiveness would inevitably lead to parallel proceedings, the AG expressed her trust in national courts, stating that if an arbitration agreement is invalid there will be no reason why a national court would not stay proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration in accordance with Article II of the New York Convention, which all Member States are parties to. 43 The problem with this analysis is that the efficiency of the proceedings could fall hostage to a slow tactical litigation in a national civil justice 41 Allianz SpA, supra n 6, para 19. 42 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra n 28, para 58. 43 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra n 28, para 73. In relation to the principle of mutual trust see Gasser, supra n 38. Gasser was criticised for having a formalistic approach favouring adherence to Brussels I over considerations of procedural justice, see eg States in the Brussels I system, depriving a party from access to a judicial remedy. 47 The CJEU reasoned that the anti-suit injunction was in conflict with the principle of effectiveness of EU law.
Therefore, the principle of effectiveness of EU law has the potential to stand in the way of a Member State's ability to control parallel proceedings. In West Tankers the threat resided in its elusive nature and the misleading impression which was left by the court that the principle of effectiveness of EU law calls for a rigid application. This was partially caused by the lack of appreciation by the court of the implications that the principle may have on future use of national measures aimed at restraining parallel proceedings, and by the brief analysis of the principle and its implication to measures that go beyond the legality of anti-suit injunctions.
For this reason, the next section will explore in more detail the principle of effectiveness and to explain its limits under the EU constitutional order, and the reforms which were brought by recast Brussels I.
44 Supra n 32. 45 Marc Rich, supra n 32 and Allianz SpA, supra n 6, paras 23 and 24. See also T Raphael, The Anti-Suit Injunction Updating Supplement (Oxford University Press, 2010), para 12.06. 46 Allianz SpA, supra n 6, para 28. 47 For example see recitals 1,3,16 and 17 of the Brussels I Regulation, supra n 18.
(a) The principle of effectiveness of EU Law in the context of West Tankers and Brussels I:
It was held in West Tankers that the imposition of an anti-suit injunction would undermine the principle of effectiveness of EU law, more specifically it would undermine the Brussels I
Regulation. 48 The Court held that the anti-suit injunction issued by a Member State court would deny a party access to a judicial remedy. 49 The CJEU reasoned that the anti-suit injunction prevented the respondent from commencing and continuing litigation proceedings before the Tribunale di Siracusa. 50 This in turn prevented the party from being able to benefit from an adequate protection of its rights of access to a remedy through the engagement of Article 5(3)
of the Brussels I Regulation. 51 By ordering a party to stop proceedings before a court of a Member State, the anti-suit injunction challenged the Italian court's freedom to determine its own jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of the Brussels I Regulation. 52 According to the CJEU, this also undermined the 'trust' between Member States that is fundamental to the current system of the Brussels I Regulation. It is important therefore to understand the meaning and limits of the principle of effectiveness of EU law. The principle of effectiveness is a fundamental aspect of EU law. 54 It is used by the CJEU as a rule for the interpretation of EU law. 55 It was emphasised as a constitutional principle of EU law in the case of Factortame I as a way of establishing a more effective application of EU rights by the national courts. 56 The Court held in this case that any national legal provision or any legislative, administrative or judicial practice which might obstruct an effective application of EU law and prevent it from being implemented in its entirety was contrary to EU law. 57 The CJEU established the importance of the principle of effectiveness in this case as it allowed for the protection of the right to judicial redress available under EU law. This protection would thereafter apply as a general obligation for courts of Member States to give adequate effect to EU law in their decision making.
58
The main function of the principle of effectiveness is to impose an obligation upon the national courts of Member States to give adequate effect to the rights and duties imposed by EU law. 59 This means that national courts in the EU should give priority to the application of EU law, its purpose and objectives, by not making the enforcement of EU rights and remedies impossible or excessively difficult. 60 More particularly, the courts must give effect to the purpose and objectives of EU legislative texts through the application of this constitutional everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.
The CJEU uses this proposition as a foundation for the application of the principle. 62 Therefore, the principle of effectiveness allows for an effective protection of individuals' EU rights and remedies. The constitutional value of the principle of effectiveness is said to be enshrined in Article 19(1) of the TEU which provides that 'Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law'. 63 The right of access to remedies under EU law is closely linked with the right of access to justice as it would not be possible to have such a right without adequate access to justice. 64 The CJEU places an emphasis on the right of access to justice and securing adequate remedies arising from EU law, as can be seen from cases such as Heylens, 65 Tele2 66 and Mono Car enforcement of EU law rights.
68
To sum up, the idea of the referral to arbitration by the anti-suit injunction was not in itself an obstacle to the party's right of access to justice in West Tankers. 69 It was rather the denial of access to the remedies found under the Brussels I Regulation that was problematic.
70
The principle of effectiveness affected the English court's ability to protect the integrity of international arbitration proceedings as it restricted it from issuing an anti-suit injunction against the court of another Member State. It was considered by the CJEU that such an antisuit injunction would pose a threat to the unification of judgments within the EU. Even where EU law is not engaged, cases suggest that the determination of the compatibility of a national procedural rule with the principle of effectiveness, such as that in
West Tankers, depends on the facts of each case. 75 Its application is subject to a test of proportionality, taking into consideration the purpose behind the offending national measure on the one hand and the restrictive effect of that measure on EU law on the other, bearing in mind the particular circumstances of the case. 76 Much, therefore, depends on the objective(s) behind the national measure and the degree of effect it may have on the application of EU law.
For example, the enforcement of a partial award declaring that a party will be entitled to an indemnity against damages awarded by a national court seised in parallel proceedings should not be deemed to be incompatible with the principle of effectiveness. This is reinforced by Article 73(2) of the Recast Brussels I which clearly gives precedence to the New York Convention, and therefore, the objective behind the offending national measure would be supportive of the policy considerations of Brussels I. The above discussion highlights the importance of the principle of effectiveness as well as its limits. In the next section it will be In the appeal to the Supreme Court of Lithuania, that court decided to stay proceedings and make a preliminary reference to the CJEU asking for a ruling on three questions: Firstly, whether a court of a Member State has the right to refuse to recognise an award issued by an arbitral tribunal prohibiting a party from bringing certain claims before the court of that Member State, which has the jurisdiction to hear the civil case as to the substance under Brussels I; Secondly, if the first question was to be answered in the affirmative, whether the same also applied where the anti-suit injunction issued by the arbitral tribunal orders a party to the proceedings to limit his claims in a case which is being heard in another Member State and the court of that Member State has jurisdiction to hear that case under the rules on jurisdiction under Brussels I. Finally, whether a national court, seeking to safeguard the primacy of EU law and the full effectiveness of Brussels I, can refuse to recognise an award if such an award 78 Supra n 3.
restricts the right of the national court to decide on its own jurisdiction and powers in a case which falls within the jurisdiction of Brussels I.
79
The CJEU chose to answer the questions together and treated the questions to mean in essence whether:
Regulation No 44/2001 must be interpreted as precluding a court of a Member State from recognising and enforcing, or from refusing to recognise and enforce, an arbitral award prohibiting a party from bringing certain claims before a court of that Member
State.
80
The CJEU chose not to deal with the second question directly. If it had, this would have broadened the scope of its reasoning to include situations where the enforcement of the arbitral award would affect court proceedings occurring in a court of another Member State, e.g. a
French court seised with a request to recognise and enforce an arbitral award ordering a party to refrain from pursuing court litigation before an Italian court exercising jurisdiction under Brussels I.
The decision of the CJEU
The main preliminary question in Gazprom was answered by the CJEU in the negative for two main reasons. Firstly, the CJEU reasoned that the anti-suit injunction, issued by an arbitral tribunal and not by a court of a Member State, fell outside the scope of Brussels I under Article 1(2)(d The rationale behind the CJEU's findings in Gazprom is not free from contention.
According to the CJEU the anti-suit order in Gazprom which was issued by an arbitral tribunal has different effects to the anti-suit injunction that was issued by a court in the case of West
Tankers. 85 The CJEU held that the reason behind this difference is that the former type would still need to be recognised and enforced as an arbitral award by a national court and would be subject to the limitations on recognition and enforcement provided for by the New York 91 It is worthwhile noting that under most legal systems an anti-suit injunction ordered by an arbitral tribunal will be treated as a procedural order and will not be given the status of an arbitral award. This is so because an award is a final decision putting an end to an issue on the merits either in whole or in part. It may be a procedural matter but that usually requires that the decision of the tribunal would put an end to the proceedings such as a decision on the jurisdiction of the tribunal. will have two repercussions with regards to the treatment of the anti-suit injunction. Firstly, it will not be possible to challenge its validity before the national court at the seat of arbitration. Secondly, procedural orders which do not finally resolve substantive rights of the parties will not be considered an 'award' under the system of the New York Convention and therefore will not benefit from its enforcement regime. Convention over the application of Brussels I, including, in a broad sense giving priority over chapter II of Brussels I which deals with the jurisdiction of the courts. 96 Gazprom, supra n 5, para 21. It appears that Supreme Court of Lithuania recognised the interim award (anti-suit order issued by the tribunal), and refused to deny recognition and enforcement based on the grounds of non-arbitrability and public policy under Art V(2) of the New York Convention. See E Storskrubb, supra n 7, 585. 97 Farah and Hourani, supra n 49. The court at the seat of arbitration could still be able to review the decision of the tribunal on the validity of the arbitration agreement. See for example Section 31 of the English Arbitration Act 1996. 98 See Gazprom, supra n 5, para 42. 99 See the discussion on the irreconcilability between an award and a judgment in Section E4 of this article.
indemnity order in an attempt to pre-empt a possible success of the parallel court action. It is important to note that the tribunal's power to award damages for a breach of an arbitration agreement has the potential of being a powerful tool in defence of arbitral proceedings. 109 The threat of the issuance of such an order acts as a raison d'être for parties not to bring proceedings before the national court in breach of the arbitration agreement.
Until the decision of Gazprom it was not absolutely clear that an award ordering a party to pay damages for breach of the arbitration agreement would not be in conflict with Brussels I, and in turn the principle of effectiveness of EU law. 110 For example, in West Tankers the tribunal was requested to make such orders by the English party which had contested the Italian court proceedings. Despite recognising that this was a matter which fell within its competence, the tribunal concluded that its power to make such awards was circumscribed by the decision in West Tankers.
111
The tribunal said that it was under a duty to apply Community Law. In order to fully appreciate the change brought about by the recast Brussels I, it is important to understand the legislative intention behind recital 12, which can be discerned from the preparatory work of the recast Brussels I. We shall also outline the amendments which have been introduced in Article 73(2) of Brussels I in so far as these affect the analysis.
Preparatory work of Recast Brussels I
The European Union Commission engaged in wide consultation with various stakeholders regarding the relationship between Brussels I and arbitration. The process included a green paper 116 and numerous communications between EU institutions highlighting in part that a solution must be found to the situation that was experienced in West Tankers. 117 The
Commission found that many stakeholders were in favour of further action to be taken by the EU in order to avoid parallel proceedings between courts and arbitration, and "abusive litigation tactics." However, views diverged among stakeholders of whether the proper solution should be made through the exclusion of arbitration "more broadly from the scope of the Furthermore, no changes were made to Article 1(2)(d) of Brussels I. In his view, the non-italicised passage above removes proceedings concerning the validity of the arbitration agreement, even as an incidental matter, from the scope of the recast Brussels I.
West Tankers conforms to the CJEU's earlier jurisprudence

AG Wathelet in
In such a way, an anti-suit injunction issued by a court of a Member State ordering parties to stop proceedings before a court of another Member State would not be seen as contrary to the principle of effectiveness of EU law.
124
Secondly, that West Tankers' reasoning was wrong and did not comply with previous CJEU decisions, namely Hoffmann 125 and Rich. 126 Hoffmann concerned the enforcement of a German judgment before a Dutch court ordering a husband to pay monthly maintenance payments to his wife. The husband claimed that the German judgment was irreconcilable with an earlier Dutch judgment which had dissolved the marriage, a matter which fell outside the scope of Brussels I. 127 In a preliminary reference to the CJEU it was asked, inter alia, to:
establish whether a foreign judgment whose enforcement has been ordered in a
Contracting State pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention must continue to be enforced in all cases in which it would still be enforceable in the State in which it was given even when, under the law of the State in which enforcement is sought, the judgment ceases to be enforceable for reasons which lie outside the scope of the Convention.
128
As stated above, the judgment ceased to be enforceable in the Netherlands because the marriage had been dissolved by a judgment of the Dutch court in a dispute between the same parties.
129
The CJEU held that the Dutch court seised with the request of recognition and enforcement was entitled under Article 27(3) of the Brussels Convention to take into account the divorce 124 See ibid, para 127. 125 anyway because the solution to the irreconcilability, unlike the anti-suit injunction in West Tankers, was founded on the application of Brussels I, i.e. Brussels I was applicable under the old articles 27(3) and 27(4) and formed an important part of the court's reasoning.
In relation to Rich, AG Wathelet contended that Rich demands that the scope of Brussels I be assessed in relation to the subject matter of the dispute in the main proceedings.
134
AG Wathelet then went on to say that the court in West Tankers instead of examining the subject-matter of the dispute in the main proceedings, examined it in the light of another dispute, namely the dispute brought before the Italian courts and by that departed from its approach in Rich.
135
The above assessment of Rich does not pay close attention to the main question which was put before the CJEU. In Rich the claimant brought proceedings before the London High
Court requesting the court to appoint an arbitrator in accordance with the English Arbitration Act. The respondent challenged the validity of the arbitration agreement as a preliminary matter before that court. Therefore, in Rich the emphasis was on the treatment of a preliminary issue concerning the validity of the arbitration agreement in London court proceedings principally concerned with the appointment of an arbitrator. Rich reasoned that when assessing the scope of the Brussels Convention reference should be made solely to the subject-matter of the dispute.
136
In West Tankers the subject matter in the main proceedings before the Italian court was brought in tort, namely whether the ship owner was liable to pay damages to the subrogated 134 Ibid, para 110. See also Van Uden Maritime v. Deco-Line, supra n 33, that concerned the relationship between Arts 1(2)(d) and 31 of Brussels I regarding provisional measures. Relying on the reasoning in Marc Rich the Court decided that Art 24 may confer jurisdiction on the court hearing that application for a provisional measure despite that proceedings commenced on the substance of the case in arbitration (para 34 of the decision). 
No express repeal of West Tankers in Recital 12
It is important to emphasise that the CJEU in Gazprom neither supported nor rejected AG 140 However, it will be shown in E4 and 5 that important obstacles which had stood in the way of the protection of international commercial arbitration have now been removed by the recast Brussels I.
Recital 12(2) does not have the effect of reversing the West Tankers decision
Perhaps the most explicit change to Brussels I brought about by recital 12 of Brussels I recast relates to the enforceability of a judgment determining the validity of an arbitration agreement.
Recital 12 states that:
A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not an arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed should not be subject to the rules of recognition and enforcement laid down in this Regulation, 139 Recital 12 of the Recast Brussels I Regulation, supra n 1. 
The irreconcilability between an award and a judgment
The discussion above shows that Brussels I does not contain a specific solution to parallel proceedings between court litigation and arbitration in its text. The problem is that a court of a Member State may decide that the arbitration agreement is invalid and proceed to make a decision on the merits, which is within its right under Article II of the New York Convention.
147
In the meantime a tribunal may continue with the parallel proceedings and deliver a conflicting award on the same subject matter. Therefore, there is a possibility, at least in theory, that an irreconcilability between an arbitral award and a court judgment could occur, which would bring a host of problems at the time of recognition and enforcement of the Regulation judgment and the arbitral award. That, for obvious reasons, has the potential to diminish the value of the judgment as well as the value of the arbitral award. Neither the original Brussels I Regulation, nor the New York Convention, contains a solution to this problem in its text.
There are a number of possible answers to this conundrum. It is possible to argue that the national court will favour the arbitral award and engage the public policy exception in Brussels I, which stipulates that a Member State shall refuse recognition of a Regulation judgment "if such recognition is manifestly contrary to the public policy in the Member State addressed." 148 This is made more compelling when viewed from the prism of the principle of res judicata, which in relation to an arbitral award delivered before a Regulation judgment may 147 Art II of the New York Convention, supra n 3. 148 See Art 45(I)(a) of the Recast Brussels I, supra n 1.
create an issue of preclusion before the national court during the recognition proceedings of the Regulation judgment. 149 Having said that it is difficult to see how the public policy exception could operate in the context of irreconcilability between a Regulation judgment and an arbitral award. Firstly, Articles 45(1)(a) and 46 of Brussels I which allow for derogation from the enforcement system under Brussels I have been applied restrictively. The CJEU stressed that the public policy exception 'should operate only in exceptional circumstances, and the limits of the concept are a matter for interpretation of the Regulation, to be determined by the European Court'. 150 For example, the English Court of Appeal in the Wadi Sudr, discussed above, refused to apply the public policy exception to a Spanish judgment which determined that the arbitration agreement was not incorporated in the contract, despite being contrary to the English law position on the matter. 151 Moore-Bick LJ stated in the Wadi Sudr:
In my view, however much importance is attached to arbitration, or even to the principle that contracts are to be performed, it cannot be said that the failure on the part of the Spanish court in good faith to give effect in this case to an arbitration agreement imperfectly spelled out in the bill of lading (but in the eyes of English law sufficiently incorporated by reference) would involve a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the United Kingdom or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal order. 152 Secondly, when considering the main role of the doctrine of res judicata we begin to see why it is unlikely to trigger the operation of the public policy exception. The principle of res judicata is often used in order to prevent the relitigation of the same cause of action between the same parties, primarily before the court, and the arbitral tribunal. It is uncommon for it to be used in the context of irreconcilability between an arbitral award and a court judgment.
153
Moreover, the operation of the doctrine itself is highly dependent on domestic law, which makes it less conducive to uniformity and certainty. It is difficult to ascertain who is bound by the res judicata effect of an arbitral award and when the award becomes res judicata, and whether it depends on it being enforced. York Convention be applied first. 157 There are two reasons that make the above interpretation correct. The first is based on a literal interpretation of Article 73(2) which, unlike its predecessor under Brussels I [Art.
the example we make above will no doubt 'affect' the application of the New York Convention.
Therefore, we conclude that Article 73(2) demands that the enforcement regime of the New
York Convention be applied first. In a way this proposed application of Article 73(2) has a similar effect to the principle of effectiveness discussed above in D, and supported by the rationale of recital 12 (3). However, on this occasion it is EU law that has to give heed to the New York Convention. It is important to emphasise that it is not a question of primacy of the New York Convention over Brussels I so much as it is about giving effect to the New York Convention.
The second reason is based on a teleological interpretation. It is important to be reminded that according to settled case-law when:
interpreting a provision of European Union law it is necessary to consider not only its wording but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part.
159
Therefore in addition to the wording of Article 73(2) account should be given to its objective, the context in which it occurs, and the objectives pursued by the recast Brussels I. 160 In order to discover the objectives of Article 73(2) regard must be given to recital 12(3), which clearly York Convention is undermined by Brussels I or any other regional treaty for that matter.
Article 73(2) may weaken the free movement of judgments among Member States. It may further be the case that the principle of mutual trust which is so important to the system of Brussels I is prima facie compromised. In defence however it is submitted that since the given solution resides in Brussels I, this challenge to the above principles should be accepted when considering how important it is to the EU and Member States to preserve the integrity and uniformity of the New York Convention.
Finally, the above analysis should apply to any conflict between the enforcement of an arbitral award under the New York Convention and Brussels I. It should extend to a conflict between an arbitral award and part II of Brussels I which covers jurisdiction rules. Therefore where a court of a Member State is seised with a request, say for example, the enforcement of an award containing a monetary relief resulting from a breach of the arbitration agreement, this
should not be in conflict with the principle of effectiveness of EU law if by doing so it indirectly affects the jurisdiction of a court of another Member State which has seised jurisdiction under Brussels I. There is a general consensus in favour of relaxing the application of the principle of effectiveness where an interface occurs between arbitration and Brussels I, and this reading of the situation allows further movement in that direction.
Whether we accept or reject the analysis above it is important to recognise that a more explicit solution to the problem of irreconcilability between a judgment and an arbitral award should be placed high on the EU Commission's agenda during the next round of reform of Brussels I.
F. Conclusion
This article demonstrates that the system of Brussels I does not offer an express solution in its text that prevents the occurrence of parallel proceedings. Furthermore, this article casts serious doubt about the submissions made by AG Wathelet in the Gazprom case attacking the conformity of West Tankers with earlier jurisprudence of the CJEU. It also demonstrates that
West Tankers reasoning is very likely to survive despite the changes brought about by recital 12 of the recast Brussels I.
However, it is shown that the competing policies; those prevailing in the system of international commercial arbitration on the one hand, and those supporting the system of Brussels I on the other hand, have now been brought into greater harmony under the recast Brussels I. It was made clear that there have been notable reforms to the system of Brussels I that assist in organising the interface between arbitration and Brussels I, in a way which pushes forward the interests of international commercial arbitration. For example, by removing the enforcement of a judgment on the validity of the arbitral award from the enforcement regime of Brussels I, or by favouring the New York Convention enforcement regime over Brussels I in a situation of irreconcilability between an arbitral award and a Regulation judgment; or by limiting the obligation to respect the principle of mutual trust to courts of Member States as opposed to arbitral tribunals such as in the case of Gazprom; or by upholding a decision of an arbitral body to the effect that the party taking parallel court action is in breach of the arbitration agreement, and (in cases of irreconcilability between the arbitral award and a parallel court award), giving primacy to the arbitral award and enabling a national court to enforce such an order.
Whilst this does not bring to an end abusive parallel proceedings, the recast Brussels I
(by its revisions to the original Brussels I), and Gazprom (by its interpretation of key nonrevised parts of Brussels I), do certainly provide more support for international commercial arbitration by giving more scope to national courts to restrict parallel proceedings. As a result,
